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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
   
 
No. 19-2700 
   
 
AMILCAR ANTONIO FRANCISCO-LOPEZ, 
 
                                                                  Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
                                                                   Respondent 
 
     
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No.:  A041-811-480) 
Immigration Judge: Nelson Vargas Padilla 
     
 
Argued February 3, 2020 
 
Before:  SHWARTZ, SCIRICA, and RENDELL, 
Circuit Judges 
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(Opinion Filed: May 15, 2020)                                             
 
Lisa J. Kasdan (Argued) 
Marcia Kasdan 
Law Office of Marcia S. Kasdan 
127 Main Street 
1st Floor 
Hackensack, NJ 07601 
 
    Counsel for Petitioner 
 
Jeffrey R. Meyer 
Craig Alan Newell, Jr. (Argued) 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
 
    Counsel for Respondent 
 
 
   
O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
In 2012, Amilcar Francisco Lopez (Francisco), a lawful 
permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty to 
attempted second degree grand larceny in New York state.  
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More than five years later, Francisco was charged with 
removability on the grounds that his guilty plea constituted a 
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) under 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).  Francisco challenged his 
removal but two Immigration Judges (IJs) and eventually the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied his challenges.  
The BIA ruled that it would retroactively apply the new 
standard for theft-related CIMTs that it had promulgated in 
Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I. & N. Dec. 847 (B.I.A. 2016), 
to Francisco’s case and that, under that standard, Francisco’s 
2012 conviction rendered him removable. 
 
Francisco now petitions for review of the BIA’s order.  
We grant review and join several other circuits in ruling that 
the BIA should not have retroactively applied Diaz-Lizarraga.  
See Monteon-Camargo v. Barr, 918 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2019); 
Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 2018); 
Obeya v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 442 (2d Cir. 2018); Lucio-Rayos 
v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 2017).  We will vacate the 
BIA’s order and remand to the BIA for further proceedings. 
 
I 
 
Francisco is a citizen of Guatemala who was accorded 
lawful permanent resident status in the United States in 1989.  
In 2012, Francisco pleaded guilty to a charge of attempted 
grand larceny in the second degree in violation of New York 
Penal Law § 155.40(2)(b).  The charging document shows that 
Francisco obtained a stolen laptop.  Francisco then contacted 
the laptop’s owner and demanded that the owner reimburse 
him for the amount of money Francisco had paid for the laptop.  
During this exchange, Francisco sent the laptop’s owner 
sexually explicit pictures that Francisco had found on the 
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laptop.  The owner then contacted the police and Francisco was 
arrested and charged with attempted second degree grand 
larceny.  After pleading guilty, Francisco was sentenced to five 
years of probation.  An order of protection for the victim was 
placed against him.  Francisco completed his probation in 
2017.   
 
In 2018, Francisco returned to Newark Liberty 
International Airport from a trip abroad and sought admission 
to the United States as a returning lawful permanent resident.  
Instead, Francisco was classified as an arriving alien and an 
applicant for admission.  He was deemed inadmissible to the 
United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) as an alien 
convicted of a CIMT and was detained by the Department of 
Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(DHS-ICE) at the Elizabeth Detention Center in Elizabeth, 
New Jersey.  Francisco was served with a Notice to Appear 
alleging that he was subject to removal as an alien who had 
been convicted of CIMT based on his 2012 conviction for 
attempted grand larceny.  
 
Francisco filed a motion to terminate the removal 
proceedings, arguing that his 2012 conviction was not a CIMT.  
An IJ denied the motion to terminate in an oral decision.  After 
the denial, Francisco filed an application for discretionary 
relief of cancellation of removal as a lawful permanent 
resident.  A second IJ orally denied Francisco’s application for 
discretionary relief.  Francisco appealed both decisions to the 
BIA. 
 
The BIA dismissed Francisco’s appeal and adopted and 
affirmed the IJs’ rulings.  It first ruled that Francisco was 
removable for having committed a CIMT.  The BIA decided 
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that its 2016 precedent from Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I. & 
N. Dec. 847, in which the BIA promulgated a new, broader 
standard for determining whether a larceny offense constituted 
a categorical CIMT, should be applied retroactively to 
Francisco’s 2012 conviction.  In Diaz-Lizarraga, the BIA 
noted that “[f]rom the Board’s earliest days we have held that 
a theft offense categorically involves moral turpitude if—and 
only if—it is committed with the intent to permanently deprive 
an owner of property.”  Id. at 849 (emphasis in original).  But, 
based on the BIA’s analysis of developments in criminal law 
since adopting that standard, the BIA decided to “update [its] 
existing jurisprudence,” id. at 852, to require that “a theft 
offense is a crime involving moral turpitude if it involves an 
intent to deprive the owner of his property either permanently 
or under circumstances where the owner’s property rights are 
substantially eroded,” id. at 853 (emphasis added). 
 
In Francisco’s case, under the expanded Diaz-Lizarraga 
standard, the BIA held that New York’s second degree grand 
larceny statute “defines a categorical CIMT because it requires 
the accused to take or withhold property with the intent to 
permanently or virtually permanently appropriate it or deprive 
the rightful owner of its use.”  App. 7 (citing Matter of Obeya, 
26 I. & N. Dec. 856, 858–61 (B.I.A. 2016); Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 
I. & N. Dec. at 847, 854) (emphasis added).  Thus, the BIA 
ruled that Francisco was removable. 
 
The BIA also upheld the second IJ’s denial of 
discretionary relief and rejected Francisco’s claim that the IJ’s 
actions had violated his due process rights. 
 
Francisco then timely filed this appeal. 
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II1 
 
A.  Crime Involving Moral Turpitude 
 
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), an 
alien who commits a “crime involving moral turpitude” is 
“inadmissible,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), and can be 
removed, § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).  Although the INA does not 
define the phrase “moral turpitude,” the BIA defines it 
generally as “conduct that is inherently base, vile, or depraved, 
contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed 
other persons, either individually or to society in general.”  
 
1 We lack jurisdiction to review a final order of removal issued 
against an alien who is removable by reason of having 
committed a crime of moral turpitude.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(C); see Mayorga v. Att’y Gen., 757 F.3d 126, 128 
n.2 (3d Cir. 2014).  We do, however, have jurisdiction to 
review any constitutional claims or questions of law presented 
on appeal.  See Mayorga, 757 F.3d at 128 n.2.  “[W]e review 
the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo subject to the principles 
of deference set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).”  Mahn v. Att’y Gen., 
767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014).  Thus, we have jurisdiction 
here, where the case before us presents a question of law. 
   Francisco argues that venue is improper in this court.  But 
Francisco waived this objection when he conceded that venue 
is proper here “pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2), as this 
judicial circuit is where the proceedings were completed.”  
Pet’r Br. at 2; Khouzam v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 235, 249 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (indicating that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) is non-
jurisdictional and therefore subject to waiver). 
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Partyka v. Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 408, 413 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(quoting Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
 
When, as in this case, the government seeks to remove 
a noncitizen under the INA on the basis of a prior state 
conviction for a CIMT, we, as well as the BIA, “generally 
employ a ‘categorical approach’ to determine whether the state 
offense” qualifies as a CIMT.  Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 
184, 190 (2013); see Ildefonso-Candelario v. Att’y Gen., 866 
F.3d 102, 104 (3d Cir. 2017).  Under this approach, we analyze 
the statute pursuant to which the noncitizen was convicted “to 
ascertain the least culpable conduct necessary to sustain [a] 
conviction under the statute.”  Ildefonso-Candelario, 866 F.3d 
at 104 (quoting Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 465–
66 (3d Cir. 2009) (alteration in original)).  “As a general rule, 
a criminal statute is determined to define a crime as 
categorically involving ‘moral turpitude only if all of the 
conduct [the statute] prohibits is turpitudinous.’”  Javier, 826 
F.3d at 130 (quoting Partyka, 417 F.3d at 411) (alteration in 
original).  In the course of this inquiry, we focus only “on the 
elements, rather than the facts, of a crime.”  Descamps v. 
United States, 570 U.S. 254, 263 (2013); see also Jean-Louis, 
582 F.3d at 465 (quoting Knapik, 384 F.3d at 88). 
 
B.  Retroactivity of Diaz-Lizarraga 
 
In Francisco’s case, the BIA retroactively applied the 
expanded intent requirement it adopted in Diaz-Lizarraga, 
determining that New York second degree grand larceny 
qualified since the intent element under New York law aligns 
with the CIMT intent requirement that “the owner’s property 
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rights are substantially eroded.”  App. 6.2  This was not the first 
case in which it did so.  In the BIA’s published decision in 
Matter of Obeya, the BIA had retroactively applied Diaz-
Lizarraga where Obeya had been convicted of New York petit 
larceny.  See Matter of Obeya, 26 I. & N. Dec. 856 (B.I.A. 
2016), rev’d by Obeya v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 442 (2d Cir. 
2018).3  The BIA here reasoned that because “larceny under 
New York law defines a categorical CIMT because it requires 
the accused to take or withhold property with the intent to 
permanently or virtually permanently appropriate it or deprive 
the rightful owner of its use,” it fell within its new expanded 
CIMT definition.  App. at 7 (citing Obeya, 26 I. & N. Dec. 858-
61).4  The BIA, “[a]pplying the reasoning of Obeya,” held in 
Francisco’s case that N.Y. Penal Law § 155.40(2) “also defines 
 
2 Because the BIA explicitly ruled that its application of Diaz-
Lizarraga in Francisco’s case was retroactive, see App. 7, we 
do not conduct an independent analysis of whether the BIA’s 
application of Diaz-Lizarraga was retroactive.  See, e.g., 
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994) 
(holding that application of a new rule is retroactive if it 
“attaches new legal consequences to events completed before 
its enactment”). 
3 More recently, the BIA issued an unpublished, non-
precedential decision by one judge that reversed course and 
found that Diaz-Lizarraga was not to be applied retroactively, 
but we do not consider this non-precedential and unpublished 
BIA decision, which is, “[a]t most . . . persuasive authority.”  
Mahn, 767 F.3d at 173 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 
U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).   
4 As we discuss below, the Second Circuit disagreed with the 
BIA’s retroactive application of Diaz-Lizarraga. 
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a categorical CIMT” and that Francisco was therefore 
removable.  Id.5 
 
Retroactivity is not favored in the law.  This applies 
with full force to the BIA’s retroactive application of new law.  
See, e.g., Velasquez-Garcia v. Holder, 760 F.3d 571, 579 (7th 
Cir. 2014) (citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 
204, 208 (1988)).  The Supreme Court has explained in the 
context of retroactive administrative rulemaking that our 
suspicion of retroactivity: 
 
is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and 
embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than 
our Republic.  Elementary considerations of 
fairness dictate that individuals should have an 
opportunity to know what the law is and to 
conform their conduct accordingly; settled 
expectations should not be lightly disrupted.  For 
that reason, the principle that the legal effect of 
conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the 
 
5 At the time the BIA rendered its decision in Francisco’s case, 
the BIA’s decision in Obeya had been reversed by the Second 
Circuit.  Retroactivity aside, we could not affirm the BIA’s 
decision on “the grounds upon which the agency acted,” SEC 
v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943), because the BIA 
relied on precedent that was no longer good law.  See 
Henriquez Dimas v. Sessions, 751 F. App’x 368, 370 (4th Cir. 
2018) (remanding to the BIA when the BIA opinion relied on 
a prior precedential BIA opinion interpreting the definition of 
a CIMT that had since been reversed by the court of appeals). 
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law that existed when the conduct took place has 
timeless and universal appeal. 
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) 
(internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations omitted).  In 
the immigration context, our aversion to retroactivity is 
particularly significant and is generally informed by “the 
longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities 
in deportation statutes in favor of the alien.”  INS v. St. Cyr, 
533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001) (quoting INS v. Cardoza–Fonseca, 
480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987)). 
 
To determine whether an administrative agency like the 
BIA may retroactively apply a new rule in an adjudication, we 
look first to the Supreme Court’s guidance in SEC v. Chenery 
Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).  Chenery stated that the ill effects 
of retroactivity in an adjudication by an administrative agency: 
 
must be balanced against the mischief of 
producing a result which is contrary to a statutory 
design or to legal and equitable principles.  If that 
mischief is greater than the ill effect of the 
retroactive application of a new standard, it is not 
the type of retroactivity which is condemned by 
law. 
Id. at 203. 
 
In order to implement Chenery’s balancing test, we and 
several other courts of appeals apply a framework first laid out 
by the District of Columbia Circuit in Retail, Wholesale & 
Dep’t Store Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 
1972).  We first indicated our preference for this framework in 
our decision in E.L. Wiegand Division v. NLRB, 650 F.2d 463, 
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471 (3d Cir. 1981), and formally adopted it in Laborers’ 
International Union of North America, AFL-CIO v. Foster 
Wheeler Corporation, 26 F.3d 375, 392 (3d Cir. 1994).  Under 
this well-established standard, an agency may not retroactively 
apply a new rule of law in an adjudication if retroactive 
application would create “manifest injustice.”  Laborers’ Int’l, 
26 F.3d at 390.6  To determine whether retroactivity would 
create “manifest injustice,” we, again following the District of 
Columbia Circuit in Retail, Wholesale, have applied a five-
factor test to guide our analysis.  Laborers’ Int’l, 26 F.3d at 
392.  Specifically, we look to: 
 
(1) whether the particular case is one of first 
impression, (2) whether the new rule represents 
an abrupt departure from well established 
practice or merely occupies a void in an unsettled 
area of law, (3) the extent to which the party 
against whom the new holding is applied in fact 
relied on the former rule, (4) the degree of the 
burden imposed, and (5) the statutory interest in 
application of this new rule. 
Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. NLRB, 301 F.3d 167, 180 (3d Cir. 
2002) (quoting Laborers’ Int’l, 26 F.3d at 392).  We now 
proceed to apply this test to the BIA’s retroactive application 
of Diaz-Lizarraga in Francisco’s case.7 
 
6 “[A]bsent a manifest injustice,” we “follow the [agency’s] 
retrospectivity ruling.”  Laborers’ Int’l, 26 F.3d at 390. 
7 The Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit have previously 
analyzed these factors in determining that Diaz-Lizarraga may 
not be retroactively applied.  See Garcia-Martinez, 886 F.3d 
1291; Obeya, 884 F.3d 442.  The Fifth Circuit and the Tenth 
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The first factor looks to “whether the particular case is 
one of first impression.” Allegheny Ludlum, 301 F.3d at 180 
(quoting Laborers’ Int’l, 26 F.3d at 392).  “[A] case of ‘first 
impression’ is a case in which one party successfully urged the 
[agency] to change its rule while a case of ‘second impression’ 
is any subsequent case brought before the [agency] on the same 
issue.”  Beneli v. NLRB, 873 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(citing Retail, Wholesale, 466 F.2d at 383–84, 387).  Because 
“[e]very case of first impression has a retroactive effect,” the 
first factor weighs in favor of allowing retroactive application 
of the new rule in cases of first impression.  Laborers’ Int’l, 26 
F.3d at 392 (quoting Chenery, 332 U.S. at 203). 
 
This factor favors Francisco because his case clearly did 
not present a question of first impression.  Diaz-Lizarraga was 
the case of first impression, because the BIA changed the intent 
necessary for a larceny crime to involve moral turpitude.  See 
Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 854–55.  As this case was 
brought subsequent to Diaz-Lizarraga, it is a case of second 
impression.  See Obeya, 884 F.3d at 445 (holding it was 
presented with a case of second impression); Garcia-Martinez, 
886 F.3d at 1295 (holding, in the alternative, that it was 
presented with a case of second impression). 
 
Second, we consider “whether the new rule represents 
an abrupt departure from well established practice or merely 
occupies a void in an unsettled area of law.”  Allegheny 
Ludlum, 301 F.3d at 180 (quoting Laborers’ Int’l, 26 F.3d at 
 
Circuit decided this question without reference to the five-
factor test but reached the same result.  See Monteon-Camargo, 
918 F.3d 423; Lucio-Rayos, 875 F.3d 573. 
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392).  We find that the second factor also favors Francisco.  
See, e.g., Garcia-Martinez, 886 F.3d at 1295 (“[O]n its face, 
the decision to abandon the literally-permanent deprivation test 
was a rather abrupt change in the law, to say the least.”).  The 
government argues that Diaz-Lizarraga was not an “abrupt 
departure” from prior law because the new Diaz-Lizarraga 
standard simply formalized BIA precedent that had been 
iteratively expanding the old standard without explicitly 
overruling or replacing it.  It makes a number of arguments 
based on several BIA cases in which an intent to permanently 
deprive may have been presumed or used to distinguish from a 
temporary taking, urging that these precedents may have “led 
the Board in Francisco’s case to the same conclusion that the 
New York offense of second-degree grand larceny involves 
moral turpitude.”  Resp. Br. at 31. 
 
But these arguments are belied by the very text of the 
BIA’s decision in Diaz-Lizarraga.  There, the BIA explicitly 
indicated that it intended the change to constitute an “update 
[to the BIA’s] existing jurisprudence,” 26 I. & N. Dec. at 852, 
that the BIA would not “continu[e] to adhere to” its prior 
standard, id. at 854, and that the BIA “overruled” any prior 
decisions that “required a literal intent to permanently deprive 
in order for a theft offense to be a crime involving moral 
turpitude,” id. at 855.  This indicates that the BIA intended to 
and did make an “abrupt departure from well established 
practice.”  Allegheny Ludlum, 301 F.3d at 180. 
 
Moreover, we find the Second Circuit’s rigorous 
analysis and rejection of the government’s other arguments 
relating to this factor to be helpful to our analysis.  In Obeya, 
the court noted that although the BIA had in certain cases 
presumed intent to permanently deprive where the offense 
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statute did not explicitly require it, the BIA never actually 
“dispense[d] with the requirement of an intent to permanently 
deprive” before Diaz-Lizarraga.  See Obeya, 884 F.3d  
at 446–47 (discussing Matter of Jurado-Delgado, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. 29 (B.I.A. 2006) and Matter of Grazley, 14 I. & N. Dec. 
330 (B.I.A. 1973)). 
 
We also agree with the Obeya court’s reasoning that the 
BIA’s reliance on the changes in state theft statutes over time 
undermines rather than supports the government’s argument.  
884 F.3d at 445–46.  The BIA had originally based its intent 
requirement on a state-law distinction between permanent and 
temporary takings that is no longer relevant.8  Diaz-Lizarraga, 
26 I. & N. Dec. at 851.  In Diaz-Lizarraga, the BIA admitted 
that its “case law ha[d] not kept pace with [those] 
developments” in state criminal laws and, therefore, it was 
required to “update [its] existing jurisprudence” by expanding 
the intent requirement for theft CIMTs.  Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I. 
& N. Dec. at 852; see Obeya, 884 F.3d at 445–46.  Contrary to 
the government’s urging, this context only bolsters our 
conclusion that, in Diaz-Lizarraga, the BIA abruptly departed 
from prior practice in order to “update [its] existing 
jurisprudence” to reflect modern trends in state criminal laws.  
See Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 852.  Accordingly, we 
agree with the Second Circuit that “[g]iven the BIA’s case 
law . . . and the Board’s own descriptions of its precedents,” 
Diaz-Lizarraga was an express and abrupt departure from 
 
8 This distinction, as the government notes, is now largely 
anachronistic after most states adopted the Model Penal Code’s 
expanded intent requirement for theft crimes.  See Diaz-
Lizarraga, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 851–52. 
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longstanding BIA practice.  Obeya, 884 F.3d at 448.  The 
second factor therefore favors Francisco. 
 
Third, we consider the extent to which the party against 
whom the new holding is applied relied on the former rule.  The 
government argues that we must look only to whether 
Francisco “in fact relied” on the BIA’s prior precedent in 
deciding whether to plead guilty to attempted second degree 
grand larceny, citing our precedent in Allegheny Ludlum and 
Laborers’ International.  See Allegheny Ludlum, 301 F.3d at 
180 (quoting Laborers’ Int’l, 26 F.3d at 392).  The government 
asserts that we should find that this factor bolsters its position 
because Francisco has not presented any evidence that he 
actually relied on the BIA’s prior precedent when he pleaded 
guilty in 2012. 
 
We take this opportunity to clarify our analysis of the 
reliance factor as we will consider it in the immigration 
context.  As a general rule, an alien defendant’s decisions in a 
criminal proceeding, especially his or her decisions about 
whether to plead guilty, implicate distinctively weighty 
reliance interests.  The Supreme Court has observed that 
“deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most 
important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on 
noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”  
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010) (internal 
footnote omitted); see also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 322 (“[A]lien 
defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement 
are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their 
convictions.”).  In fact, defense counsel has a duty, under the 
Sixth Amendment, to advise alien-defendants of the 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea, including whether 
the offense is a removable offense.  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369.  
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In the immigration context, therefore, defendants in criminal 
proceedings are highly likely to rely on BIA precedent to 
determine whether they will be deported if they are convicted 
of a particular state crime.  For this reason, the reliance factor 
operates quite differently in the immigration context from the 
way in which it operates in other contexts where courts 
sometimes find that the adjudication implicates “relatively 
modest stakes.”  Laborers’ Int’l, 26 F.3d at 378. 
 
For this reason, we hold that, in immigration cases, the 
third factor will favor the party challenging retroactivity if it 
would have been reasonable for the alien to have relied on the 
BIA’s prior precedent.  We follow the Second, Seventh, and 
Ninth Circuits in distinguishing our analysis of the reliance 
factor in the immigration context.  See Obeya, 884 F.3d at 448 
(“[W]hen conducting retroactivity analysis in the immigration 
context, we look to whether it would have been reasonable for 
a criminal defendant to rely on the immigration rules in effect 
at the time that he or she entered a guilty plea.”); Velasquez-
Garcia, 760 F.3d at 582 (When analyzing the reliance factor, 
“the critical question is not whether a party actually relied on 
the old law, but whether such reliance would have been 
reasonable.”); cf. Garcia-Martinez, 886 F.3d at 1295 (“[W]e 
will presume that [the petitioner] was aware of the then existing 
rule when he pled guilty. . . .”).  Because it would have been 
reasonable for Francisco to rely on the BIA’s prior precedent 
in this case, we find that this factor favors Francisco. 
 
Fourth, we consider “the degree of the burden imposed” 
by retroactive application of a new rule.  Allegheny Ludlum, 
301 F.3d at 180 (quoting Laborers’ Int’l, 26 F.3d at 392).  This 
factor also favors Francisco.  Removal from the United States 
would impose a severe burden on him.  See Padilla, 559 U.S. 
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at 365 (“We have long recognized that deportation is a 
particularly severe ‘penalty’ . . . .” (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893))); Obeya, 884 F.3d at 
445 (“‘[R]emoval from the United States, with life-changing 
consequences,’ is a ‘massive’ burden for any immigrant.” 
(quoting Lugo v. Holder, 783 F.3d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 2015))); 
Garcia-Martinez, 886 F.3d at 1295 (“[T]here can be little 
doubt that the change in the rule—the new rule—will impose 
a new and severe burden upon [the petitioner].”) (footnote 
omitted).  In any case, the government concedes that this factor 
favors Francisco. 
 
Lastly, we consider “the statutory interest” in applying 
the new rule retroactively.  Allegheny Ludlum, 301 F.3d at 180 
(quoting Laborers’ Int’l, 26 F.3d at 392).  This factor, like each 
of the other four factors, favors Francisco.  As the government 
points out, the BIA has authority to assess, subject to judicial 
review, which criminal statutes create categorical CIMTs and 
to ensure that its assessments are uniformly administered in 
removal proceedings.  But, in this case, we see no discernable 
BIA uniformity interest in retroactively applying Diaz-
Lizarraga: the BIA had uniformly applied the prior standard 
for more than seven decades before deciding to change course.  
See Garcia-Martinez, 886 F.3d at 1295-96 (holding that the 
BIA’s uniformity interests do not “have a great deal of weight 
in a case like this one where the BIA lived with the preexisting 
rule for seven decades and, in fact, until just a couple of years 
ago would have treated [the petitioner] as a person who had not 
committed CIMTs”); Obeya, 884 F.3d at 449 (holding that 
uniformity “has hardly been a consistent feature of 
immigration law” and that “the government has no compelling 
interest in removing individuals for crimes that were not 
considered to reflect so negatively on their character at the time 
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the offenses were committed”).  This factor therefore favors 
Francisco. 
 
Each of the five factors that guide our “manifest 
injustice” inquiry favor Francisco.  Accordingly, we hold that 
the BIA erred in retroactively applying the newly expanded 
theft CIMT definition it set forth in Diaz-Lizarraga in 
Francisco’s removal proceedings.  We will vacate the BIA’s 
order and remand to the BIA.9 
 
C.  Discretionary Relief 
 
Francisco also petitions for review of the BIA’s denial 
of his application for discretionary cancellation of removal.  
 
9 As the government correctly urges, instead of conducting our 
own de novo inquiry into whether N.Y. Penal Law § 155.40(2) 
constitutes a categorical CIMT under the previous CIMT test, 
we remand Francisco’s case to the BIA for further proceedings 
on that question.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 
186 (2006) (per curiam) (holding that we are “not generally 
empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being 
reviewed and to reach [our] own conclusions based on such an 
inquiry.  Rather, the proper course, except in rare 
circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional 
investigation or explanation.”) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  In addition to the government’s argument, 
we also note that the BIA did not explore the contours of the 
New York statute under the old CIMT definition and that N.Y. 
Penal Law § 155.40(2) contains an extortion element that 
might distinguish it from other larceny offenses such as the 
New York petit larceny offense that was at issue in the Obeya 
case.  See Obeya, 884 F.3d at 443. 
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Francisco alleges that the IJ who denied his application 
violated his “rights to due process” by “mischaracterizing prior 
actions of the petitioner as evidence of ‘lack of respect for the 
law’; giving no consideration to a long legal work history and 
the deep connections to his United States citizen children; and 
improperly weighting the negative factors in adjudicating the 
application for relief from removal.”  Pet’r Br. at 27.  Because 
these allegations are simply artfully labelled challenges to the 
BIA’s unreviewable discretionary denial of Francisco’s 
application for cancellation of removal, we do not have 
jurisdiction.  Patel v. Att’y Gen., 619 F.3d 230, 232 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 
III 
 
We will grant the petition for review, vacate the BIA’s 
order, and remand to the BIA for further proceedings. 
